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REEVALUATING REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION: ADAPTING THE CANADIAN
PROOF STRUCTURE TO ACHIEVE THE ADA’S
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY GOAL
Caroline Cheng*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 failed to achieve
its promise of being an “emancipation proclamation for people with
disabilities.”2 In response, Congress recently amended the ADA to be
more inclusive and protective of individuals with physical or mental
impairments. Under the ADA Amendments Act,3 businesses and courts
must place less importance on the gateway question of who is legally
disabled. Instead, they must focus more often on which disabled
individuals merit accommodation.4 The purpose of these amendments is to
affirmatively “remove[] societal and institutional barriers”5 so that disabled
individuals can “fully participate in all aspects of society,”6 including the
workplace. This boils down to a goal of achieving a baseline level of equal
opportunity between disabled and able-bodied individuals.
Increasing the ADA’s coverage alone will not achieve this equal
1

* University of Pennsylvania Law School, Class of 2010. Princeton University, Class
of 2006.
1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (1994)).
2. Senator Edward M. Kennedy called the ADA a “bill of rights” and “emancipation
proclamation” for people with disabilities. See 135 Cong. Rec. 19,888 (1989) (transcribing
Senator Kennedy’s statement).
3. The Americans With Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Public Law 110325, 122 Stat. 3554 [hereinafter “ADA Amendments Act”].
4. In any given case, a number of factors will determine whether a disabled individual
must be accommodated, including: the nature and severity of his or her impairment; his or
her qualifications for the job; the reasonability of the accommodation in question; and the
relative hardship that granting the accommodation would impose upon the employer.
5. ADA Amendments Act § 2(a)(2).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
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opportunity goal. Given the broader class of individuals now protected
under the amended ADA, and given concerns about the costs of
accommodating disabled individuals, it is likely that businesses and courts
will feel pressure to restrict plaintiffs to a relatively narrow right to
accommodation.7 Additionally, absent other guidance which strengthens
the duty to accommodate, employers are still likely to win the vast majority
of disability discrimination lawsuits.
Thus, while the ADA Amendments Act primarily focuses on
expanding the definition of disability, courts interpreting the statute should
refocus on the employer’s duty to provide reasonable accommodations up
to the point of undue hardship.8 Current case law is not clear as to what
specific standards should be used to determine whether an accommodation
is reasonable.
This paper proposes that the courts should consider adopting a more
concrete standard—such as an inquiry into whether the accommodated
individual would still provide net economic benefit to the company—to
clarify when an accommodation is reasonable. This fact-based inquiry
lends itself to a proof structure more similar to that which is found in the
Canadian employment discrimination jurisprudence: Canadian courts
require an employer to provide a disabled employee with a reasonable
accommodation unless the employer can prove that its refusal to do so was
excused by a “bona fide occupational requirement.”9 Such a showing
requires proof that the employer would suffer undue hardship by providing
the accommodation.10 The Canadian approach provides a good example
for the United States because Canada and the United States have a shared
legal and cultural history; furthermore, Canada has been willing to
implement progressive anti-discrimination laws, so it can provide a guide
for the U.S. in appropriate circumstances.11

7. Courts tend to sympathize with businesses’ concerns about the cost of
accommodation, but they may not be well-educated about the measures that disabled
individuals require to have equal opportunities. See Michael A. Stein, Same Struggle,
Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 549,
646 (2004). Absent new case law, they are less likely to be willing to grant a broader right
to accommodation.
8. In determining whether a given disability-related accommodation would be an
undue hardship, the ADA directs negotiating parties or the court to consider the totality of
the employer’s circumstances, including the nature and cost of the accommodation, the
employer’s size and location, and the employer’s economic condition. 42 U.S.C. §
12111(10) (1994).
9. British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. British
Columbia (Government Service Employees’ Union), 1999 N.R. LEXIS 227, at *13
[hereinafter Meiorin].
10. Id.
11. In essence, the Canadian approach focuses on providing accommodations to all
disabled individuals to the extent that is necessary to break down stigmas and to promote
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The U.S. Supreme Court should adapt the Canadian strategy by
shifting to employers the burden of production regarding the information
most relevant to proving whether a disabled employee merits
accommodation. Employers should have to provide the evidence necessary
to establishing both the estimated value the employee would provide over
his or her work life and the estimated costs of providing the
accommodation.12
While the Canadian proof structure provides a useful comparison for
American courts, I do not mean to suggest that the Canadian approach
should be adopted without modification in the American context. Indeed,
in the U.S., the costs of accommodation are an increasingly large concern,
especially given the newly broad coverage of the amended ADA and the
current economic downturn. Therefore, American courts should reaffirm
that the right to accommodation is subject to the employee’s being
qualified in the first place, and that employers are best suited to determine
what qualifications are necessary for a particular job. Additionally, the
courts should recognize that reasonable accommodation does not require
incurring either one-time costs or loss of job productivity to the extent that
the cost of employing a disabled person would exceed the economic value
of the work he or she performs over the course of employment.
On the whole, my proposed standard and shifted burden of production
would provide a fair balance between disabled employees’ interests in
equal treatment and businesses’ underlying purpose of making money.
Furthermore, it would bring the reality of what disabled workers experience
closer in line with the ADA’s goal of equality.
II.

THE ADA OF 1990

When it was first enacted in 1990, the ADA aimed “to provide a clear
and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities.”13 Congress hoped that the disabled
would gain protections similar to those enjoyed by people who experienced
discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or
age.14 In the employment context, the ADA aimed to increase access to the
diversity and substantive equality in society. See generally id. (replacing the conventional
approach of categorizing discrimination as having either a “direct” or “adverse” effect with
a unified approach focusing on whether an employer can show that a prima facie
discriminatory standard is a bona fide occupational requirement).
12. This proposed standard and shifted burden of production does not provide courts
with guidance as to how to assess the estimated value the employee would provide, and
thus, how costly the maximally expensive reasonable accommodation would be. More
economic analysis is necessary to establish a procedure for establishing these values.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994).
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4) (1994) (“[U]nlike individuals who have experienced
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workplace by prohibiting overt discrimination and affirmatively requiring
employers to provide reasonable accommodations to qualified individuals
with disabilities.15
The ADA’s purpose was never fully realized. A series of Supreme
Court decisions narrowly circumscribed the coverage of the ADA,16 so
many disability discrimination complaints were dismissed in federal court
because the plaintiffs in question did not satisfy the statutory definition of
disability.17 Indeed, some commentators assert that courts rejected up to 97
percent of disability discrimination claims on this basis.18 Furthermore,
contrary to initial expectations, the reasonable accommodation provision of
the ADA generated relatively little conflict,19 as courts infrequently reached
the question of whether an employer had satisfied its duty to reasonably
accommodate a disabled employee.20

discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age, individuals
who have experienced discrimination on the basis of disability have often had no legal
recourse to redress such discrimination.”).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (1994). The statute prohibits both intentional disparate
treatment on the basis of disability and the failure to provide reasonable accommodation,
and it counts both as types of discrimination.
16. See e.g., Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184
(2002) (concluding that an individual should not be held legally disabled unless he or she
was prevented or severely restricted from performing tasks that are central to most people’s
daily lives); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding that an
individual would not be considered legally disabled if he or she could manage his disability
with “mitigating measures” such as glasses or medicines); see also Chai Feldblum,
Restoring Congressional Intent and Protections Under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
p. 16, testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, &
Pensions, Nov. 15, 2007 (“In recent years, the Supreme Court has restricted the reach of the
ADA’s protections by narrowly construing the definition of disability contrary to
Congressional intent.”).
17. See Michael Selmi, Interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act: Why the
Supreme Court Rewrote the Statute, and Why Congress Did Not Care, 76 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 522, 523 n. 7 (2008) (citing RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST
DECADE OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 69-95 (2005); Ruth Colker, The Americans
with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 99-103
(1999); John W. Parry, Trend: Employment Decisions Under ADA Title I—Survey Update,
23 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 294, 294-98 (1999); Study Finds Employers
Win Most ADA Title I Judicial and Administrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 403, 404 (1998)).
18. Feldblum, supra note 16, at 17.
19. Selmi, supra note 17, at 523-24.
20. Cf. Amy L. Allbright, 2006 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I—Survey
Update, 31 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 328, 328 (July/Aug. 2007) (implying
that plaintiffs very frequently lost their cases because they did not qualify as disabled under
the ADA).
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III. THE ADA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008
Congress signed the ADA Amendments Act into law on September
25, 2008 in response to the weak protections offered by the ADA of 1990.
This Act declares that disabilities “in no way diminish a person’s right to
fully participate in all aspects of society,”21 including participating in the
workforce. This Act broadens protections for the disabled by greatly
expanding the covered class and by calling for the affirmative “remov[al]
of societal and institutional barriers” in appropriate cases.22
The Amendments Act’s broader vision of the protected class stems
from the overly narrow construction of that class prior to the Act’s passage.
Prior to the passage of the Amendments Act, the term “disability” was
construed so narrowly that many individuals traditionally considered to be
disabled were excluded from the ADA’s coverage, including individuals
with epilepsy,23 muscular dystrophy,24 diabetes,25 an amputated limb,26 or a
traumatic brain injury.27 This narrow coverage resulted from a series of
Supreme Court decisions which drastically limited the facially broad
language of the ADA. In particular, Sutton v. United Air Lines narrowed
the ADA’s coverage by requiring courts to inquire whether mitigating
measures28 would allow impaired employees to perform “major life

21. ADA Amendments Act § 2(a)(2).
22. Id.
23. See e.g., EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F. 3d 349, 351-52 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding
that an epileptic woman who woke up with bruises on her limbs after “shaking, kicking,
salivating and, on at least one occasion, bedwetting” was not disabled under the ADA
because “[m]any individuals fail to receive a full night of sleep”); Todd v. Academy Corp.,
57 F. Supp. 2d 448 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (dismissing an epileptic employee’s disability
discrimination claim because anti-seizure medication alleviated many of his symptoms, and
he therefore did not qualify as disabled under the ADA).
24. See e.g., McClure v. General Motors Corp., 75 Fed. Appx. 983 (5th Cir. 2003)
(concluding that a man with muscular dystrophy was not disabled under the ADA because
he had adapted “how he bathes, combs his hair, brushes his teeth, dresses, eats, and
performs manual tasks by supporting one arm with the other, repositioning his body, or
using a step-stool or a ladder”).
25. See e.g., Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 297 F. 3d 720 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that
the ADA did not protect a diabetic employee whose doctor ordered him to take a half-hour
lunch break so he could manage his blood sugar levels).
26. See e.g., Williams v. Cars Collision Center, LLC, No. 06 C 2105 (N.D. Ill. July 9,
2007) (holding that a woman with an amputated arm did not have a disability, but a mere
“physical impairment,” because she was not “prevented or severely restricted from doing
activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives”).
27. See e.g., Phillips v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (S.D. Ala. 1999)
(denying that a man was disabled under the ADA even though he had suffered a traumatic
brain injury which resulted in a four-month coma, dizziness, spasms in his arms and hands,
slowed learning, and slowed speech).
28. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999). Mitigating measures can
include wearing glasses, taking medicines, or other treatments.
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activities”—if so, they would not be considered disabled. Additionally, the
subsequent case of Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v.
Williams further limited the scope of the ADA by requiring an individual to
first prove that he or she has “an impairment that prevents or severely
restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance
to most people’s daily lives.”29
Like the original enactment of the ADA, the Amendments Act
requires that an impairment “substantially limit one or more major life
activities” in order to be considered a disability.30 Additionally, both
statutes state that a person will be considered disabled if he or she has a
record of such an impairment,31 or if he or she is regarded as having such an
impairment.32 Despite these similarities between the language of the ADA
and the Amendments Act, the Amendments Act prescribes a much more
generous definition of disability than the ADA by adding rules of
construction which make it clear that “the question of whether an
individual’s impairment is a disability under the ADA should not demand
extensive analysis.”33
The Amendments Act explicitly rejects the restrictive definitions of
disability in Sutton34 and Williams.35 Thus, when determining whether an
impairment substantially limits a major life activity under the Amendments
Act, courts can no longer take mitigating measures into account (with the
exception of glasses and contact lenses).36 Additionally, the Act gives the
phrase “major life activities” a far more expansive definition than that
expressed in Williams. The concept now includes, for instance, caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping,
walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading,

29. Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 185
(2002).
30. 42 U.S.C. 12102 § 3(1) (2008).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. ADA Amendments Act § 2(b)(5).
34. See ADA Amendments Act § 2(a)(4) (“the holdings of the Supreme Court in Sutton
v. United Air lines, Inc. . . . and its companion cases have narrowed the broad scope of
protection intended to be afforded by the ADA, thus eliminating protection for many
individuals whom Congress intended to protect”).
35. See ADA Amendments Act § 2(b)(4)-(5) (criticizing Williams as promoting an
“inappropriately high level of limitation necessary to obtain coverage under the ADA”).
36. Despite Congress’s rejection of Sutton’s broad holding, Sutton would have come
out the same way under the ADA and the Amendments Act because of this exception for
glasses and contact lenses. Cf. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999)
(holding that Petitioners were not disabled within the meaning of the ADA because
corrective measures such as glasses or contact lenses would enable them to function
identically to those without similar impairments and thus not limit them in the performance
of major life activities).
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concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.37 The Amendments
Act also rejects the EEOC regulations which defined the term
“substantially limits” as “significantly restricted”38 because this definition
“express[ed] too high a standard.”39 Instead, the Amendments Act requires
that the EEOC issue regulations interpreting “substantially limits . . .
[consistent] with the findings and purposes of the ADA Amendments Act
of 2008.”40
The Amendments Act is therefore very likely to cover individuals
whom society would traditionally consider to be disabled (such as the
previously mentioned employees with epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, brain
injury, etc.). However, the outer bounds of the Act’s coverage remain
uncertain.
Businesses will be concerned that the Amendments Act’s definition of
major life activity is so broad that essentially anyone with an impairment
can qualify as disabled. Arguably, the effect of the Amendments Act is to
expand the definition of disability so as to remove any likelihood that a
disability claimant can be excluded on the grounds that a disability does not
exist, and therefore to require that courts always consider issues of
qualification for the job and reasonable accommodation by the employer.
In this sense, the Amendments Act makes the ADA much more similar to
another major anti-discrimination statute, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act.41 Title VII does not question whether a claimant in a racial
discrimination case, for instance, is a member of a specific racial group;
instead, it requires the court to assess the employee’s job qualifications and
the employer’s potentially discriminatory actions.42
The amended ADA prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing]
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability.”43
A qualified individual is “an individual with a disability who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of
the [relevant] employment position.”44 The ADA makes clear that
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2008).
38. ADA Amendments Act § 2(a)(8).
39. Id.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(B) (2008); ADA Amendments Act § 506 (granting the
EEOC, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Transportation authority to issue
regulations interpreting the definitions of disability (including rules of construction)).
41. See generally, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2007) (stating, “It shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . ”).
42. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(m), Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071; Desert
Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973);.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2006).
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prohibited discrimination includes not only “traditional discrimination,”45
but also the failure to make “reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability . . . unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of [its]
business.”46
Indeed, the Amendments Act declares that “disabilities in no way
diminish a person’s right to fully participate in all aspects of society, but
that people with physical or mental disabilities are frequently precluded
from doing so because of [discrimination].”47 Accordingly, the statute
directs courts deciding cases under the ADA to focus on “whether entities
covered under the ADA have complied with their obligations” to treat the
disabled equally,48 which may require “preferences in the form of
‘reasonable accommodations’ that are needed for those with disabilities to
obtain the same workplace opportunities that those without disabilities
automatically enjoy.”49
This language supports the view that the ADA’s mandate to
reasonably accommodate is best viewed under the anti-subordination
theory of discrimination. The anti-subordination theory submits that the
categorical exclusion of an individual from a workplace benefit because of
his or her disability is arbitrary, degrading, and unfair because many
disabilities are irrelevant to one’s capacity to do a job.50 For example,
being wheelchair-bound does not affect an individual’s ability to work as a
successful law professor. Indeed, perhaps this law professor is only
considered disabled in comparison to an arbitrary, societally-imposed
baseline, where the environment is built to support walking individuals.
While it is tempting to think of the ADA’s accommodation provision
as a redistributive measure where the disabled are receiving an extra gain,

45. The phrase “traditional discrimination” is referring to the direct denial of formally
equal treatment because of an individual’s disability. See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1)
(2006) (including in the definition of discrimination the acts of “limiting, segregating, or
classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or
status of such applicant or employee because of the disability of such applicant or
employee”). Such traditional discrimination against a disabled individual is analogous to
the denial of a job opportunity to an individual because of her race or color under Title VII.
See supra note 42.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2006).
47. ADA Amendments Act § 2(a)(2).
48. Id. (explaining that discrimination against the disabled can take the form of
“prejudice, antiquated attitudes, or the failure to remove societal and institutional barriers”).
49. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397 (2002) (emphasis in original); 42
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5).
50. Cf. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 465-66 (2001) (arguing that the anti-subordination
theory explains the harm of first generation race or gender-based discrimination).
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the anti-subordination theory is more appropriate. Traditionally, many
commentators thought that “real” anti-discrimination laws remedied the
exclusion of similarly situated members of protected categories from
workplace opportunity to achieve equality for certain historically
marginalized groups.51 These commentators thought that “by affirmatively
requiring employers to provide reasonable accommodations to existing or
potential workers with disabilities, the ADA does more than simply level
an uneven playing field.”52
Michael Stein argues against this traditional view, contending that
biological variations are viewed as abnormal partially “because a dominant
group has imposed [artificial] conditions that are most favorable to its own
circumstances.”53 Therefore, “ADA-mandated accommodations resemble
antidiscrimination remedies not simply due to their comparable results, but
because fundamentally they are antidiscrimination remedies.”54 The
statute’s goal of removing the subordination of individuals with disabilities
is a product of formal and equalizing justice, not redistributive justice,
because it acknowledges that equal access to goods and opportunities in the
workplace is not a special benefit.55 Rather, this equal access to benefits of
employment is something that all employees who are qualified for their
jobs are entitled to have. Therefore, reasonable accommodations are
suitable remedies to those artificial workplace conditions that historically
excluded the disabled.56
While the amended ADA is likely to be effective in addressing
traditional discrimination against disabled individuals protected by the
statute, it is less clear whether it will be as effective in reaching its “basic
equal opportunity goal” with regards to individuals who require
accommodation.57 The ADA clearly requires employers to provide
qualified individuals with “reasonable accommodation,” but it leaves as a
“great unsettled question” the matter of what can or should be considered a
51. Stein, supra note 7, at 582-83.
52. Id. (“Compelling employers to accommodate disabled workers, these scholars
agree, pushes both the workplace equilibrium and its financial calculus beyond equality, and
thus differentiates the ADA from its predecessors. The conception of disability—related
accommodations being distinct from Title VII antidiscrimination prohibitions is so
pervasive that it has [made] the Supreme Court [more hostile to plaintiffs bringing failure to
accommodate claims under the] ADA . . . .”).
53. Id. at 601.
54. Id. at 583 (emphasis omitted).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 637.
57. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397 (2002) (“[T]he Act specifies . .
. that preferences will sometimes prove necessary to achieve the Act’s basic equal
opportunity goal. The Act requires preferences in the form of ‘reasonable accommodations’
that are needed for those with disabilities to obtain the same workplace opportunities that
those without disabilities automatically enjoy”).
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reasonable accommodation.58
In Judge Posner’s words, reasonable
accommodation “requires something less than the maximum possible care .
. . [relative to] the benefits of the accommodation to the disabled worker as
well as to the employer’s resources.”59
IV. CURRENT CASE LAW FALLS SHORT OF ACHIEVING FORMAL
EQUALITY FOR EMPLOYEES WHO REQUIRE REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION
The Supreme Court articulated the current standard for when a given
accommodation will be required under the ADA in the recent case, U.S.
Airways Inc., v. Barnett.60 In that case, the Court denied the disabled
plaintiff’s request for an exception to his company’s seniority system so he
could keep his less physically demanding job. The Court reasoned that
accommodating the plaintiff by granting the exception was unreasonable
“in the run of cases” because it would disrupt other employees’
expectations of “fair, uniform treatment” under the seniority system.61
Additionally, the Court was unconvinced that the plaintiff showed any
special circumstances which warranted a finding that the accommodation
was reasonable in his specific situation, even though he had presented
evidence that his employer reserved the right to change “any and all” of its
hiring and promotion policies without advance notice.62 The Court
concluded by noting that, even if the plaintiff had been able to show that
the accommodation was reasonable, the employer could still assert the
undue hardship defense.63
Barnett’s holding is flawed for two reasons. First, it does not provide
specific enough guidance as to what accommodations businesses will be
required to grant, ex ante. Indeed, Barnett leaves open several important
questions. What constitutes a reasonable accommodation “in the run of
cases”? What is a reasonable accommodation in an individual case?
Second, and more fundamentally, Barnett’s holding usually would not

58. Stein, supra note 7, at 646 (citing Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen,
Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L. J. 1, 8 (1996)).
59. Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir. 1995); see
also Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (establishing that reasonable
accommodation does not require an employer to bear more than a “de minimis” cost).
60. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
61. Id. at 403-04.
62. See id. at 423-24 (Souter, J. and Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is hard to see the
seniority scheme here as any match for Barnett’s ADA requests, since U.S. Airways
apparently took pains to ensure that its seniority rules raised no great expectations.”).
63. Id. at 402 (stating that the employer will not be required to provide a reasonable
accommodation if it proves that the requested accommodation would impose an undue
hardship in the specific case at bar).

CHENGFINALIZED_EIGHT

2010]

3/31/2010 2:06:00 AM

REEVALUATING REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION

591

require an employer to grant a disputed accommodation, and it protects
certain disabled individuals more than others. Thus, it creates tension with
the amended ADA’s stated goal of providing equal opportunity to all
qualified individuals with disabilities.64 Under Barnett, it is far easier for a
plaintiff to prove traditional discrimination than the failure to reasonably
accommodate. The plain language of the ADA does not contemplate any
difference between types of discrimination in that there is an equally strong
prohibition against traditional discrimination and the failure to reasonably
accommodate.65 A plaintiff will be able to show traditional discrimination
by proving his or her prima facie case, so long as the employer is not able
to rebut the inference that its agents had an illegitimate motive.66 In
contrast, a plaintiff seeking an accommodation must prove not only his or
her prima facie case of discrimination, but must also prove either that the
accommodation is reasonable in most cases or that there are special
circumstances warranting the accommodation in his or her specific case (a
difficult standard to meet under Barnett).67
Businesses will likely press the courts to continue applying Barnett
broadly due to their concerns that a less employer-friendly burden-shifting
framework would require them to provide accommodations in more cases,
including cases where opportunistic employees try to excuse bad work
behavior by asserting the protections of the ADA. This is a valid concern,
but it is mitigated by limitations to an employer’s duty to accommodate.
There are four main limitations: the requirement that an individual be
qualified,68 the requirement of reasonability,69 the defense of undue
hardship,70 and the definition of “substantially limits.”71 These limitations
would help ensure that a more employee-friendly standard would not
excessively harm businesses.
64. A narrow interpretation of Barnett would limit its holding to the facts, e.g., to cases
involving requested exceptions to a seniority system.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006) prohibits discrimination against a qualified individual
on the basis of disability with regard to employment. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (2006) defines
the word “discrimination” as including not only classic disparate treatment, but also as
including the failure to provide reasonable accommodations, unless such accommodations
would impose an undue hardship on the employer.
66. Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
67. See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 391 (holding that there were no special circumstances
which warranted requiring the accommodation even though the employer had frequently
bent its seniority rules for other employees).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2006).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2006).
70. See supra note 9 (illustrating how the Canadian courts allow defendant employers
to show undue hardship).
71. The EEOC’s definition of the term “substantially limits” will determine the
boundaries of the amended ADA’s coverage by helping to establish which individuals will
be considered legally disabled.
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Given Barnett’s holding, the ADA Amendments’ broadening of the
protected class may not, in and of itself, be enough to achieve the ADA’s
anti-discrimination mandate. Barnett is narrowly written and lacks
sufficient guidance as to what accommodations are reasonable;
furthermore, it normally requires a showing of reasonableness in the “run”
of similar cases, as it is difficult to show that special circumstances justify
accommodation in the individual case.72 Thus, under the amended ADA
and Barnett, the ADA’s protections may be broad, but they are also weak.
V.

TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE STANDARD FOR REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION

A standard which requires employers to accommodate a disabled
individual if he or she would provide net economic benefit to the company
over his or her work life would further the formal equality goals of the
Amendments Act while protecting employers’ economic interests. This
standard would require decision-makers to assess the employee’s
qualifications for the job, the estimated value that the employee would
provide over his or her work life, and the total cost of the accommodation.73
Because of the undue hardship defense, this standard would not overly
burden employers with excessive expenditures.74
This standard is consistent with what Cass Sunstein has called the
“best understanding” of reasonable accommodation:
“that an
accommodation would be unreasonable if the costs exceeded the
benefits.”75 However, cost-benefit analysis can be conducted not only with
the costs to the employer of providing the accommodation and the benefits
to the employer that the employee provides over his or her lifetime, but
with other costs and benefits as well.
In fact, another option is to consider the costs to the employer of
providing the accommodation versus the benefits to the employee of using
the accommodation.76 This option corresponds with Judge Posner’s
conception of which costs and benefits to consider in Vande Zande.77
Sunstein has criticized Judge Posner’s approach in Vande Zande because it
72. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 395, 403 (2002).
73. Employees are much less likely than employers to have access to the information
that would allow them to calculate these figures.
74. See supra note 9 (allowing employers to show excessive expenditures as an undue
hardship defense for accommodations they cannot make).
75. Cass Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis Without Analyzing Costs or Benefits:
Reasonable Accommodation, Balancing, and Stigmatic Harms, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1895,
1899 (2007).
76. See id. at 1908 (mentioning both the economic and emotional benefits
accommodations provide disabled employees).
77. Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir. 1995).
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did not adequately consider the emotional benefits that an accommodation
would provide a disabled employee.78
Sunstein argues that any
measurement of benefits to the employee must account for both the
economic and emotional benefits that an accommodation would provide.79
However, even if Judge Posner’s version of cost-benefit analysis was
modified to include assessments of emotional benefits, employers would be
likely to undervalue these benefits because they have financial incentives to
do so and because the accommodation is subjectively more important to the
employee than the employer. For this reason, it is preferable to use the
benefits the employee’s work provides the company instead of the benefits
the accommodation provides the employee, as the latter option would likely
result in employers granting fewer accommodations than the ADA
Amendments envision.80
No matter which benefits one decides to take into account, requiring
individualized cost-benefit analysis will refocus the debate on the costs of
accommodation, a subject of heated controversy during the debates leading
up to the ADA of 1990’s passage.81 Accommodations aren’t always as
costly as many businesses first assume. Employers participating in a recent
Department of Labor study reported that accommodations usually were not
very expensive and provided the company with tangible benefits. This
report states:
“Of the employers who gave cost information related to
accommodations they had provided, 251 out of 447 (56%) said
the accommodations needed by employees and job applicants
with disabilities cost absolutely nothing. Another 164 (37%)
experienced a one-time cost . . . . Of those accommodations that
did have a cost, the typical one-time expenditure by employers
was $600.”82

78. Cass Sunstein argues that the reduction in stigma experienced by disabled
employees is a valid—even essential—consideration when assessing the economic benefits
of accommodations to employees. See Sunstein, supra note 75, at 1909 (discussing
potential valuation of benefits through the employee’s “willingness to pay” for
accommodation versus his or her “willingness to accept” lack of accommodation. The latter
accounts for emotional effects on the employee). But see Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of
Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir. 1995) (refusing to account in more than a cursory
way for stigma that the plaintiff would face if she were not accommodated).
79. Sunstein, supra note 75, at 1909.
80. To assess the benefits the employee’s work would provide to the employer,
decision-makers need to know labor costs. These costs are not proprietary in some cases,
for instance, in cases regarding union contracts. However, employers have an incentive not
to provide labor cost numbers in a legal proceeding where they would become public, both
because labor costs may be proprietary (particularly skilled labor mix and costs) and
because of privacy concerns for other employees in the same or similar job categories).
81. Allbright, supra note 20, at 328.
82. Job Accommodation Network, U.S. Department of Labor’s Office of Disability
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Furthermore, employers who had made accommodations for
employees with disabilities reported multiple benefits as a result.83 The
most frequently mentioned direct benefits were “(1) the accommodation
allowed the company to retain a qualified employee, (2) the
accommodation increased the worker’s productivity, and (3) the
accommodation eliminated the costs of training a new employee.”84 The
most widely mentioned indirect benefits employers received were “(1) the
accommodation ultimately improved interactions with co-workers, (2) the
accommodation increased overall company morale, and (3) the
accommodation increased overall company productivity.”85
Because accommodations often are not as costly as businesses would
initially assume, and because they provide employers with valuable
benefits, the proposed standard requiring individualized cost benefit
analyses probably will result in more disabled individuals being
accommodated. Employers should not be too worried about this standard
because it would not require employers to take on employees who would
cause the company a net long-term economic loss, and it would not require
them to take on such high economic costs relative to their short-term
budgets as to cause undue hardship.86 Moreover, the standard would allow
an employer to decide whether its employees are qualified for their jobs
and whether their work would profit the company in the first place.
Businesses might argue that an employee’s yearly compensation
package already captures the exact economic value of the employee’s
contributions to the company, so any granted accommodation makes the
employee less valuable to the company and gives him or her extra
compensation. Additionally, businesses might argue that asking the
company to make the accommodation and bear all the costs of doing so is
unfair to their other workers in the “run of cases,”87 as these employees’
work may have become more difficult because of the accommodation—this
is the very reasoning that underlies Barnett.88 According to these
arguments, perhaps a disabled employee should have to pay part of the
accommodation he or she is granted.

Employment Policy, Workplace Accommodation: Low Cost, High Impact 2 (2007),
http://www.jan.wvu.edu/media/LowCostHighImpact.doc [hereinafter Job Accommodation
Network].
83. Id. at 2.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See generally Meiorin, supra note 9 (requiring employers to provide
accommodations for disabled Canadians in the absence of a bona fide occupational
requirement or undue economic hardship on the employer).
87. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401-03 (2002).
88. Id. Arguably, in Barnett, the other workers in similar jobs would lose benefits of
their own seniority because of the disabled worker’s accommodation.
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However, this idea runs afoul of the anti-subordination theory
underlying the ADA, which states that all individuals who are qualified for
their jobs deserve equal access to the benefits of employment.89 This theory
argues that accommodations place disabled and able-bodied individuals at
the baseline level of access to workplace opportunities that all qualified
employees are entitled to have. Therefore, forcing an employee to pay part
or all of the accommodation is equivalent to impermissibly penalizing him
or her because of his or her disability.
Furthermore, accommodating a disabled employee can yield direct
benefits to the employer, if the employee is known to be productive,
because it will allow the business to keep a valuable worker.90 More
generally, accommodating any employee, whether he or she is known to be
productive or not, can yield indirect benefits to the employer in terms of
improved employee morale and improved public image.91 Finally,
accommodation can provide tangible benefits to other employees: for
instance, a reading device that magnifies print can benefit employees other
than the disabled worker because the machine is durable and can be used
by other individuals when the disabled employee is not using it.92 These
benefits to the business and its other workers justify asking it to pay the
cost of the accommodation.
VI. ADAPTING THE CANADIAN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION PROOF
STRUCTURE WOULD BETTER IMPLEMENT THIS PROPOSED STANDARD
FOR REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
American courts should consider adapting the Canadian framework by
shifting the burden of production to employers regarding reasonable
accommodation. Employers should have to provide evidence relevant to
establishing the estimated value that employees similarly situated to the
plaintiff would provide over their work lives and the costs of providing the
accommodation in question. Canadian courts require employers to provide
reasonable accommodations unless their refusals to do so are related to
business necessity and the accommodations in question would cause undue
hardship.93 The Canadian strategy of placing the burden of production on
employers is well-suited to implementing my proposed standard because it
would force employers to reveal hard-to-find information relevant to the

89. Stein, supra note 7, at 637-39 (discussing how the ADA helps eliminate some of the
artificial disadvantages for disabled individuals in the workplace).
90. Job Accommodation Network, supra note 82, at 1.
91. Id.
92. Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 839, 846
(2007).
93. Meiorin, supra note 9, at *47.
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inquiry of whether an employee would economically benefit the company.
As a preliminary matter, the Canadian approach provides a useful lens
through which to contemplate potential solutions to problems in the
American employment law jurisprudence. Indeed, Canada has developed a
legal analysis for employment claims that is very similar to the one in this
country.94
Yet, in general, Canada’s approach to employment
discrimination issues is significantly more progressive than that of the
U.S.’s, and the Canadian experience may provide a “roadmap” for moving
U.S. law in that direction when appropriate.95
The major anti-discrimination statutes in Canada include the Canadian
Human Rights Act (“CHRA”) and its sister statutes at the provincial level.96
These statutes “have an elevated legal status,” meaning that their provisions
trump those of other non-constitutional sources of law.97 Unlike the
American civil rights statutes,98 Canada does not use separate analyses for
assessing intentional disparate treatment cases and unintentional disparate
impact cases.99 Further, while the United States uses separate statutes to
analyze different genres of discrimination,100 the CHRA does not
94. Joseph A. Seiner, Disentangling Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment:
Adapting the Canadian Approach, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 95, 118 (2006); see also
Austen Parrish, Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Law, 2007
UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 637, 673 (2007) (pointing out that Canada “‘share[s] a common law
heritage . . . liberal democratic and federal structures of government’ and other historical,
societal, and legal similarities that make their laws particularly well suited to comparison”).
95. Seiner, supra note 94, at 118.
96. Canadian Human Rights Act [hereinafter CHRA]; Ontario Human Rights Code;
British Columbia Human Rights Code.
97. Meiorin, supra note 9, at *40.
98. American courts still use separate analyses for so-called “disparate treatment” and
“disparate impact” cases. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299
(1977) (detailing the systemic disparate treatment analysis in the Title VII context); Int’l
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 343 n.23 (1977) (inferring that the
employer’s hiring policy was discriminatory from the “inexorable zero,” i.e., the employer’s
complete failure to hire any minority taxi drivers); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971) (outlining disparate impact analysis in the Title VII context). However, unifying the
inquiries for disparate treatment and the disparate impact, like the Canadian system does,
would further help the disabled to integrate into society and the workforce. Such a unified
system would also provide a simpler, more elegant analytical framework for thinking about
disability discrimination cases. Eliminating the separation between these analyses in the
ADA context would be beneficial because: the distinction is artificial, as few fact patterns
fit neatly into one track or the other; the effect on the employee is the same, regardless of
whether the employer discriminated intentionally or not; and the availability of damages
will vary depending on which track the fact pattern is analyzed under. See Seiner, supra
note 94, at 132 (explaining the Canadian system).
99. See Meiorin, supra note 9, at *41-46 (collapsing the formerly distinct analyses for
disparate impact cases and disparate treatment cases under Canadian law).
100. For instance, the ADA covers disability discrimination, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act covers age discrimination, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act covers
race, sex, gender, national origin, and alienage discrimination.
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differentiate among disability discrimination, sex discrimination, race
discrimination, or any other type of covered discrimination.101 Finally,
while the ADA is somewhat unique among American civil rights laws in its
requirement that employers reasonably accommodate,102 the CHRA
imposes a duty to accommodate for all types of covered discrimination.103
Despite these differences between the ADA and the CHRA, the burdenshifting aspects of the Canadian jurisprudence are worth considering and
importing into the ADA context.
The CHRA and its sister statutes aim to achieve “substantive equality”
through “transformative measures” which make society and the workforce
more egalitarian and diverse.104 Substantive equality requires more than
achieving formal equality of treatment and opportunity; it also requires
breaking down those systemic rules and practices which lead to inequitable
results. The Canadian Supreme Court criticizes the formal equality model
because this model does not require decision-makers to “challenge the
imbalances of power, or the discourses of dominance, such as racism, ablebodyism, and sexism, which result in a society being designed well for
some and not for others,” and because it “allows those who consider
themselves ‘normal’ to continue to construct institutions and relations in
their image, as long as others, when they challenge this construction, are
‘accommodated.’”105 In contrast, the Court lauds the ideal of substantive
equality underlying the CHRA, which “abandon[s] the idea of ‘normal’ and
work[s] for genuine inclusiveness.”106
The Supreme Court of Canada most recently addressed the means by
which the Canadian Human Rights Tribunals shall work towards the goal
of substantive equality in British Columbia (Public Service Employee
101. See CHRA Part I (3)(1) (“For all purposes of this Act, the prohibited grounds of
discrimination are race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual
orientation, marital status, family status, disability and conviction for which a pardon has
been granted.”).
102. The only other statute which requires reasonable accommodation in the
employment context is the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Pregnancy Discrimination Act,
amendment to Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(k) (1978).
103. See CHRA Part I (15)(2) (“For any practice mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) to be
considered to be based on a bona fide occupational requirement and for any practice
mentioned in paragraph (1)(g) to be considered to have a bona fide justification, it must be
established that accommodation of the needs of an individual or a class of individuals
affected would impose undue hardship on the person who would have to accommodate
those needs, considering health, safety and cost.”).
104. Meiorin, supra note 9, at *39; CHRA; Ontario Human Rights Code; British
Columbia Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, ch.210 (2008). Similarly, the Amendments
Act contemplates that disability should not be a barrier to full participation in society and
the workforce, so that the affirmative removal of stereotypes and of societal and institutional
barriers is an appropriate anti-discrimination remedy. ADA Amendments Act.
105. Meiorin, supra note 9, at *37.
106. Id. at *38.
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Relations Commission) v. British Columbia Government Service
Employees’ Union (Meiorin).107 In this case, the female plaintiff was fired
from her job as a firefighter for having failed the provincial government’s
new aerobic standard for physical fitness.108 The Court found this aerobic
standard to be discriminatory because 65 to 70 percent of male applicants
passed this test on their initial attempts, while only 35 percent of female
applicants had similar success.109 The Court held that the Government had
not discharged its burden of showing that it had accommodated the plaintiff
up to the point of undue hardship because it presented “no credible
evidence” showing that the prescribed aerobic capacity was necessary for
either men or women to perform the work of a forest firefighter
satisfactorily.110
Meiorin is notable for many reasons,111 but for the purposes of this
analysis, it is relevant because it is the most recent Canadian Supreme
Court case to address an employer’s duty to accommodate. Like its
predecessors, Meiorin reaffirms that once the employee proves that he or
she was treated differently because of his or her disability, the employer
bears the burdens of production and proof to demonstrate that it would
suffer undue hardship if it were to provide the accommodation in question
to individual employees sharing the characteristics of the plaintiff.112

107. Canada has Human Rights Tribunals at the federal and provincial levels. These
Tribunals implement the Human Rights statutes.
108. Meiorin, supra note 9, at *11.
109. Id. at *17. It should be noted that, in contrast to the American approach, the
Canadian approach requires employers to accommodate individuals who face discrimination
on any prohibited grounds (not just disability or religion).
110. Id.
111. Meiorin is the case which first made clear that the goal of Canadian Human Rights
legislation was to create substantive equality. Id. at *39. Furthermore, in Meiorin, the
Supreme Court of Canada laid down a framework that unified the analyses for disparate
treatment and disparate impact and that set a new test for when an employer would be
required to grant an employee a workplace accommodation. In the first step of this new test,
the Court required the plaintiff to prove a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that
the practice or policy in question has a discriminatory effect. In the second step, it shifted
the burden to the employer to prove that: (1)its practice was enacted for a purpose rationally
related to business necessity; (2) it enacted its practice in the good faith belief that the
practice was reasonably necessary to achieve this purpose; and (3) the practice was
reasonably necessary to achieve this purpose. For an employer to prove that the practice
was reasonably necessary, it must demonstrate it would suffer undue hardship if it provided
accommodation of individual employees sharing the characteristics of the plaintiff. Id. at
*48-49.
112. Id. at *61. See also Ontario Human Rights Commission and O’Malley (Vincent) v.
Simpson-Sears, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 (directing the employer to pay the employee the
difference between her earnings as a part-time employee and what she would have earned as
a full-time employee because there was no evidence that further steps would have caused
undue hardship and would have been unreasonable); Bhinder v. CN, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 561
(finding that the employer’s hard-hat rule was a bona fide occupational requirement and it
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Canadian discrimination law aims to be more far-reaching than
American discrimination law; indeed, some of its cases criticize American
discrimination law for being too parsimonious.113 Thus, it is inappropriate
to import the Canadian approach completely into American law.
In light of both the similarities and the differences between the CHRA
and the ADA,114 U.S. courts should adapt the Canadian approach by
placing upon the employer the burden of production regarding otherwise
hard-to-find information relevant to whether a disabled employee would
economically benefit the company. By doing so, the courts would create a
framework which would fortify the protections of the Amendments Act and
would help to achieve the Act’s goal of providing a baseline level of equal
opportunity to both able-bodied and disabled individuals.
VII. CONCLUSION: RETHINKING REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
To sum up the argument, the broadened coverage of the amended
ADA will be insufficient, in and of itself, to achieve an adequate baseline
level of equal opportunity between the disabled and able-bodied.115 Those
disabled individuals who require reasonable accommodation will still have
difficulty fully participating in the workforce under the ADA Amendments
and Barnett, even though the ADA does not distinguish between
would be an undue burden for them to make an exception to the rule).
113. See e.g., Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970
(rejecting the American “de minimis” standard for undue hardship as too lenient and noting
that employers are obligated to endure some hardship as members of an egalitarian and
diverse society).
114. The CHRA aims to be far more inclusive and protective than the ADA does. In
fact, the Canadian employment discrimination jurisprudence is too plaintiff-friendly to
import without modification into the American context. In Meiorin, the Supreme Court of
Canada made clear that the goal of Canadian Human Rights legislation was to strike down
actions or policies with discriminatory effects—regardless of whether there was any intent
to discriminate, and regardless of whether such actions or policies adversely affected one
individual or many—so as to recreate a society which did not use discriminatory norms. In
contrast, the ADA only mandates that qualified disabled workers must be granted
accommodations on the individual level so they can fully participate in the workforce. The
ADA does not envision creating sweeping systemic changes which alter what is considered
normal, and it does not contemplate completely reforming the workforce so that it suits the
disabled and the able-bodied equally well.
115. The Amendments Act charges the EEOC, the Attorney General, and the Secretary
of Transportation with issuing regulations, including rules of construction, to implement the
definitions of disability. My argument assumes that the EEOC and other governmental
agencies will not create a restrictive definition of “disability,” so disabled individuals
generally will not face problems in proving this threshold requirement. Indeed, the
Amendments Act commands the EEOC to promulgate more inclusive definition of
“substantially limits” for the purposes of determining who is disabled. This definition will
be binding on the courts. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(5), 122
Stat. 3553 (2008).
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individuals who experience traditional discrimination and individuals who
are denied reasonable accommodation.
To remedy this inconsistency, American courts should require
employers to make individualized cost-benefit assessments of disabled
employees when deciding whether the accommodations in question are
reasonable. Such an analysis will have to include information about the
worker’s qualifications and productivity as well as the objective costs of
accommodation. Under this proposed standard, employers will have to
accommodate qualified employees if it is economic to do so, unless
providing the accommodation would lead to undue hardship.116
The U.S. Supreme Court will have to reassess current case law and
move away from Barnett to implement this proposed standard. Because
the Canadian jurisprudence has illustrated a way to achieve greater equality
without excessively harming businesses, the Court should consider
adapting the Canadian approach to implement this standard. The Court
should require employers to produce information relevant to establishing
the estimated value an employee would provide over his or her work life
and the estimated costs of providing the accommodation.
Since the Court recently enumerated the burden-shifting framework
for analyzing reasonable accommodations in Barnett, it may be reluctant to
revisit the issue so soon. However, the Amendments Act explicitly
requires reasonable accommodations for the disabled in order to equalize
workplace opportunity, and Barnett does not provide an adequate
framework for deciding what accommodations are reasonable. Therefore,
another Court visit is needed to strengthen and develop the protections of
the Amendments Act.

116. See Meiorin, supra note 9, at *61 (requiring employers to demonstrate that
accommodating individuals with similar characteristics would pose an undue economic
burden).

